



 "48 ABSURD MEETINGS 
BETWEEN  
TUĐMAN AND MILOŠEVIĆ" 
Miroslav Tuđman 
SAŽETAK: Zadnji predsjednik predsjedništva SFRJ Stjepan 
Mesić bio je ključni svjedok optužbe haškoga Tužiteljstva u 
slučaju Blaškić. Između ostaloga, on je svjedočio da su se 
predsjednici Tuđman i Milošević u Karađorđevu dogovorili o 
podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine. Ključni argument za Mesića da 
su se predsjednici Tuđman i Milošević dijelili Bosnu i 
Hercegovinu je podatak da su se sastali 48 puta. Autor 
analizira tih 48 „apsurdnih susreta“. Prije internacionalizacije 
jugoslavenske krize predsjednici Tuđman i Milošević susreli 
su se 13 puta; osim dva susreta ostali susreti bili su 
multilateralni. Poslije internacionalizacije jugoslavenske krize 
predsjednici Tuđman i Milošević susreli su se 35 puta u 
organizaciji međunarodnih posrednika; na 48 susreta na 
kojima su kako tvrdnji Mesića, Tuđman i Milošević „dijelili 
Bosnu“ na najmanje 31 susretu sudjelovao je i predsjednik 
Alija Izetbegović. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Stjepan Mesić, podjela Bosne i 
Hercegovine, haški tribunal, krivokletnik 
 
ABSTRACT: The last president of the Presidency of 
Yugoslavia, Stjepan Mesic was a key witness for the ICTY 
Prosecution in the Blaskic case. Among other things, he 
testified that President Tudjman and Milosevic in 
Karadjordjevo agreed on the division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. A key argument for Mesic that the presidents 
Tudjman and Milosevic divided Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
the fact that they met 48 times. The author analyzes the 48 
"absurd meetings". Before the internationalization of the 











































 times; except for two meetings other meetings were 
multilateral. After the internationalization of the Yugoslav 
crisis Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic met 35 times in the 
organization of international mediators; at 48 meetings at 
which according to Mesic, Tudjman and Milosevic "divided 
Bosnia" at least 31 meeting was also attended by President 
Alija Izetbegovic. 
KEYWORDS: Stjepan Mesic, a division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, ICTY, perjurer 
Intoduction 
One of the crucial figures, himself being the product of overall 
developments resulting from the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia, but also one of the creators of wrong or false 
ideas about these developments, is Stjepan Mesić. Unlike 
others, he played a key role, because he appeared in The 
Hague as a key witness for the Prosecution in the General 
Blaškić case as early as 1998. His testimony, lacking 
intellectual and political depth, knowledge of the European 
context and the history of Yugoslavia, understanding of ethnic 
relations in the former Yugoslavia and awareness of the 
influence of international officials on the destiny of small 
nations, became a paradigm of the assessment of the official 
Croatian policy in the 1990s. Moreover, it served as a basis 
for all other indictments against Croatian officials and 
generals not only from Croatia, but also from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The testimony of Stjepan Mesić is the subject matter of 
this analysis. In it, we will not deal with indictments against 
the Croats in The Hague, we will not analyse political 
circumstances or activities of the Hague Tribunal or the 
Prosecutor as well as testimonies given by other witnesses or 
documents produced in the Court. Instead, we will focus on 
what Stjepan Mesić told investigators and in the courtroom 
and on what the Tribunal admitted into evidence, in order to 
verify its credibility. 
What did Mesić testify about in the General Blaškić case 
before the Hague Tribunal, revealed Harmon, the Prosecutor, 
at the very beginning of his testimony: the meeting at 
Karađorđevo in 1991 where “the partition of Bosnia" was 
agreed on, the policy leading to the partition of Bosnia 
between Croatia and Serbia, the involvement of the Croatian 
Army in the war between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, 




















































Bosnia and Herzegovina, applicable Croatian laws tending to 
undercut Bosnian independence etc. 
What Mesić did testify about in The Hague is not 
supported by facts and documents. It is a falsehood told in a 
manner which he perfected during his political career – 
consisting of falsifying facts, shifts in time when describing 
events in order to change their context and meaning, 
omissions of relevant data and facts, the inclusion of 
irrelevant data in his deposition, even of making up 
statements and events which did not happen, being silent on 
his own role or attaching importance to himself and assuming 
a role he did not have etc. 
A falsehood is a euphemism for a lie. Since Stjepan Mesić 
testified under oath, each court, including the Hague Tribunal, 
should sanction false depositions on oath as perjury. 
However, this did not happen. Moreover, Mesić demanded to 
be a protected witness, so that his testimony would not be 
available to the public. 
1. About the context of the meeting at Karađorđevo 
This is how Prosecutor M. Harmon announced Prosecution 
witness Stjepan Mesić before the Hague Tribunal in the 
General Blaškić case on 16 March 1998: ”He will testify about 
President Tuđman’s dual policy towards Bosnia, one which 
was a public policy of recognition of the independence of 
Bosnia, and a clandestine policy to divide Bosnia between 
Croatia and Serbia. He will testify in that regard about a 
meeting that took place in 1991 between Slobodan Milošević 
and President Tuđman at Karađorđevo, after which President 
Tuđman’s clandestine policy to divide Bosnia was 
implemented.”1 
Before we start analysing the meeting at Karađorđevo and 
President Tuđman’s policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
we should warn about Mesić’s testimony concerning the 
context of the meeting at Karađorđevo. What did he say about 
the context of the meeting between Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević at Karađorđevo? 
“From the moment the formation of states in the former 
Yugoslavia began, they met for about 48 times. Imagine 
how absurd would that be, had Hitler and Churchill met so 
                     












































many times during the Second World War. Here, too, it 
was half-crazy: we waged defensive war, while the heads 
of the states held meetings.”
2
 
Source: testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 March 1998 
“The reports would come to us second-hand, because it 
was not logical for us to be waging war against Slobodan 
Milošević while at the same time advising – receiving his 
adviser in Zagreb and discussing maps with her. 
Obviously, this had to be done in secret.” 
Source: Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 
March 1998 
There are several pieces of disinformation in these two 
sentences. Firstly, there was nothing secret about it, because 
the media covered all meetings, and so they did this one as 
well: 
“OSIJEK, 10 April (Hina) – A group of Serbian and 
Croatian scholars and political experts, formed by the 
President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, 
and the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo 
Tuđman, met today for the first time at Tikveš near Osijek. 
The group consists of academician Kosta Mihajlović, 
Smilja Avramov, Prof. Ph.D., Ratko Marković, Prof. Ph.D. 
and Vladan Kutlešić, Ph.D. as its Serbian members, and 
from academician Dušan Bilandžić, Smiljko Sokol, Prof. 
Ph.D., Zvonko Lerotić, Prof. Ph.D. and adviser to the 
President Josip Šentija as its Croatian members.  At their 
first meeting, the group members started identifying 
problems and ways of resolving the Yugoslav political 
crisis and, especially, problems related to the Croat 
Serbian relations. It was concluded that the group would 
continue to work soon”
3
.  
Secondly, Mesić claimed that “it was not logical for us to be 
waging  war against Slobodan Milošević” at the beginning of 
April 1991, while it was logical enough to insist on Mesić’s 
appointment as President of the Presidency of the SFRY one 
month later, in May 1991, and to agree to his appointment in 
                     
2 He repeated the comparison to Churchil and Hitler when testifying in The 
Hague, but he changed its context somewhat:” You do not have to make 
any assumptions. Read what Hrvoje Šarinić said.  He said he met with 
Milošević 13 times during the war and they reviewed a wide range of 
issues. Can you imagine, during the Second World War, Churchill meeting 
with Hitler, or their chiefs of cabinets meeting and discussing political 
issues and doing that 13 times on the top of everything (Case No IT-95-
14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 March 1998). 




















































August 1991. Mesić’s testimony consists mostly of such 
statements that insinuate, rather than analyse or interpret 
certain policy. Unfortunately, the format of this book prevents 
us from mentioning all of his disinformation of this kind. 
…both you and I watched in January 1994 meetings 
between representatives of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in 
Geneva, and when they were sitting around a map, 
FranjoTuđman, Karadžić, Boban and Milošević were 
standing to the side and they were reviewing these maps, 
what would belong to whom without the Muslims. 
I correct myself – only the Serbs and Croats were present, 
the Muslims were not there. This was in January 1994. 
This was broadcast on television. I was flabbergasted 
because I understood what this meant.” 
Source: Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 
March 1998. 
Question: Was that not part of the international 
negotiations, the bilateral talks within international 
frameworks? 
Answer: Certainly, even the international community is not 
without blame. I am absolutely convinced that Lord Owen 
was endeavouring to break up Bosnia-Herzegovina and I 
do not think I forgive him. He is one of the culprits, too, that 
all this happened. 
Source: Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 
March 1998. 
Prosecutor M. Harmon was right when he asked for an 
explanation about the context of the meeting at Karađorđevo, 
so that one might understand what was discussed there and 
what was agreed on, if anything could have been agreed on 
at all. Mesić claimed that the Karađorđevo meeting was only 
one of 48 meetings between “the heads of the states” and 
that it was “absurd” and “half-crazy”. According to Mesić’s 
testimony, the absurd situation reached its climax at the 
beginning of 1994, when Milošević requested that Mesić be 
removed from office on the grounds that Tuđman “cannot 
reach any agreement with Milošević”. 
Since Mesić signed these statements of his in his 
deposition of 1997 and repeated them in The Hague 
courtroom in 1998, they are to be taken as his firm intention to 












































It is true that Presidents Tuđman and Miošević met 48 
times but on different grounds and under different 
circumstances than Mesić claimed. 
It is a fact that S. Mesić knew the exact number of 
meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević and that 
he judged them as half-crazy and absurd, i.e. that he would 
never attended them 
According to Mesić, “the partition of Bosnia” was 
discussed at these meetings that were sponsored by the 
international community. Mesić is “absolutely convinced that 
Lord Owen was endeavouring to break up Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” and “I do not think I forgive him that”. Mesić 
believes that Lord Owen is “one of those who are to blame” 
implying that his plans for the constitutional order of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina were plans to divide Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
As Mesić himself emphasised, “I was for an integral 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which meant in political 
terminology of the time concerning the constitutional order, 
that Mesić advocated a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, or 
that for Mesić each discussion, programme or agreement 
about the federal or con-federal model of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina constituted “the partitioning of Bosnia”. 
Mesić’s testimony about 48 meetings between Presidents 
Tuđman and Milošević presents for the Prosecutor crucial 
evidence about continual efforts to reach an agreement “to 
divide Bosnia” , because, instead of waging war, these two 
kept on meeting and drawing maps about how to divide 
Bosnia. Neither the Prosecutor nor General Blaškić’s Defence 
required from the Prosecution witness Stjepan Mesić to give 
more detailed information about these 48 meetings: where 
and when they took place, who organised them, who attended 
them, what was discussed at meetings and so on. Had they 
done it, and they should have in the interest of the truth and 
justice, they could have revealed how Mesić manipulated 
both, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Hague Tribunal, as he 
testified in 1997 and 1998. The information about 48 meetings 
between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević is (partly) true. In 
his statements, Mesić systematically put this information in 
the context of the following statement: “Imagine how absurd 
would that be, had Hitler and Churchill met so many times 
during the Second World War”. 
He deliberately choose not to tell the full information about 




















































unscrupulously deceived about the importance of his role 
during international negotiations on the peaceful solution of 
the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Prosecutor’s Office wanted Mesić to be the key 
witness for the Prosecution because of high offices he held 
during his political career. It is, however, highly unlikely that 
even the Prosecutor’s Office could have assumed that 
someone having no dignity, with no moral scruples and willing 
to tell lies and deceive even when testifying in court, might 
occupy such prominent positions as Mesić did. 
An insight into the information about 48 meetings between 
Presidents Tuđman and Milošević points to such conclusion 
already. 
2. Review of 48 “absurd” meetings between Presidents 
Tuđman and Milošević 
The table hereinbellow offers a review of “the 48 meetings” 
between Croatia’s President Franjo Tuđman and Serbia’a 
President Slobodan Milošević. Some historians or analysts of 
that period and the developments in question might disagree 
as to the number of the meetings. Such differences are 




For example, President Francois Mitterand talked in Paris 
with Presidents Tuđman and Milošević (in Paris on 28 August 
1991), but these were separate talks about the same topic. 
There are no records in the media that Presidents Tuđman 
and Milošević personally met. How “to regard” the 
negotiations in Dayton? As a single meeting or according to 
the number of meetings that were held during the 
negotiations? 
All this is irrelevant for this analysis. According to the 
information available to the public, the number of meetings is 
identical to the one given by Mesić. Possible corrections to 
the information will not significantly modify a type of the 
meetings, reasons for them or the period when the meetings 
between the two Presidents took place. In order to provide 
objective indication as to the nature of the meetings, we used 
the reports by news agencies adding no comments. 
                     
4 The differences are possible because as criterion may be used a physical 
meeting itself, or a common statement or agreemente made or reached 























































Prior to the meeting of the federal 
SFRY Presidency, a meeting between 
the Croatian and Serbian delegations 
was held about the Yugoslav crisis; The 
Croatian side tried to avert a military 
coup prepared by the YPA. President 
Tuđman: ”We were on the verge of  
civil war. The army has mobilised. 
















The second round of the YU-Summit. 
The talks on the political future of 
Yugoslavia resumed in Belgrade. 
Besides the members of the Yugoslav 
political leadership, the Presidents of all 
republics and provinces also attend the 
meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency. 
The representatives of Croatia and 
Slovenia required that the YPA’s role in 
the resolution of the present political 
crisis in the country be considered. 
After a lengthy and, occasionally, 
painful discussion, the participants 
agreed that the inner Presidency would 
discuss the role and position of the YPA 
















At the meeting between the Presidents 
of all Yugoslav republics in Sarajevo, 
Izetbegović presented the idea of “an 
asymmetrical federation”: “Serbia and 
























































federation, Slovenia and Croatia in a 
confederation with the first two, while 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia would be equally close and 












Hina: “Croatian President Franjo 
Tuđman and Serbian President  
Slobodan Milošević, met today in the 
border area betweenthe two republics. 
During lengthy long talks on key issues 
relating to a political and economic 
crisis and the future relations 
inYugoslavia, the Presidents 
considered the main issues to be 
discussed at the forthcoming meeting 
of the republics’ Presidents.  Despite 
well known differences in opinions 
about the basic issues  concerning the 
interests of Croatia and Serbia, i.e. of 
the Croatian  and the Serbian peoples, 
both Presidents took into account that 
the  relations between Croatia and 
Serbia are crucial for the overall 
relations between Yugoslav republics 
and, as such, for the solution  to the 
political crisis in the SFRY. Therefore, 
their efforts were aimed at eliminating 
the options that might endanger the 
interests of the Croatian and Serbian 
peoples alike and at seeking permanent 
solutions that would guard the historic 
interests of peoples. The following was 
concluded:  
- to determine the period for solving 
the existing Yugoslav problems of two 
months at longest, that will be 
submitted as a joint proposal at the 
forthcoming meeting of the republics’ 

























































The first meeting of the presidents of 
the six Yugoslav republics about the 
resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is held 
in Villa Dalmatia in Split. HINA found 
out from unofficial sources that, after an 
introduction by Croatia’s President 
Franjo Tuđman, who presented 
Croatia’s proposal for the union of 
sovereign states or separation, all 
Presidents took part in a two-hour 
discussion which followed thereafter. 
Slovenia’s President Milan Kučan put 
forward Slovenia’s proposal for 
separation. 
Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević 
repeated his previous proposal that the 
Federal Executive Council should be 












The second meeting between the 
Presidents of the republics was held in 
Belgrade. Topics: Referendum and the 
manner of separation; Tuđman and 
Gligorov proposed a union of sovereign 












The third presidential meeting was held 
at Brdo near Kranj (Slovenia). Topic: 
The elaboration of the separation model 
and the referendum. It was established 












“The President of the Republic of 
Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and the 
President of the Republic of Serbia, 
Slobodan Milošević, met near the 
Croatian border to resume the talks on 
the relations between the two republics 
and to discuss the results of the work of 

































































The fourth meeting between the 
Presidents of Yugoslav republics was 
held at Villa Biljana at Ohrid 
(Mecedonia). HINA: ”With regard to 
the fact that, at the last meeting at Brdo 
near Kranj, the agreement was reached 
to hold in each republic a referendum 
on its future status by the end of May, it 
is expected that the Presidents will 
define propositions for such 
referendum. They will also discuss 
mutual rights and obligations of  
republics and in particular of each 
republic with regard to the existing 
federal state. Finally, the Presidents will 
also discuss the functioning of joint 
bodies during the transition period until 
they reach an agreement about new 














The fifth presidential meeting was held 
at Plavi dvorac at Cetinje 
(Montenegro). Topic: Separation. 
Izetbegović and Gligorov announced 
their joint compromise proposal for the 
resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The 
President of the Republic of Croatia 
left the press conference because of 
numerous insults from journalists who 












Hina: “The sixth meeting between the 
Presidents of the Yugoslav republics or 
the Presidents of the Yugoslav republic 

















































today.  The participants of the meeting 
resumed considering the future 
Yugoslav system of government.  
They agreed on the following: 
1. All unsettled issues should be settled 
by mutual agreement in a peaceful and 
democratic manner and in the common 
interest. In doing so one should take 
into account the gravity of the 
economic and social crisis  in 
Yugoslavia and the appeal by the 
European Community. 
The proposal by Presidents Alija 
Izetbegović and Kiro Gligorov 
constitutes a solid basis to resume talks 
on regulating the relations between the 
Yugoslav republics. This should be 
discussed in each republic together with 
other proposals submitted at the 
meeting. 
2. Since the troubled interethnic 
relations generate, among other things, 
the crisis in Yugoslavia, and since they 
manifest themselves in some republics 
in particular, it has been agreed to hold 
a special meeting soon between 
Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
3.The participant hold the opinion that 
the Presidency should resolve a crisis, 
caused by the failure to elect the 
President and the Vice-president of the 
SFRY Presidency, in accordance with 
the Constitution and the Rules as soon 
as possible. 
4. The President agreed to intensify 


























































“In accordance with the resolution 
passed during the last week talks 
between the Presidents of the republics 
or the republic Presidencies, a meeting 
between the Presidents of Croatia, 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević 
and Alija Izetbegović, was held in Split 
today… 
Since the proposals submitted at the 
Sarajevo meeting will be discussed in 
republics in the next few days, 
conditions will be met to define more 
quickly and precisely the elements 
needed to find a solution to the 
political and constitutional crisis, i.e. 
for just regulation of the relations 
between Yugoslav peoples and 
republics. The principle of national 
equality and the interests of all peoples 
should be taken as a starting point.” At 
the meeting “…there was much talk 
about Bosnia and Herzegovina  and the 
possibility of introducing a cantonal 
system in that republic” HINA, Baza 














The tripartite meeting of Split between 
Tuđman, Milošević and Izetbegović 
resumed in Belgrade. The topic of the 
meeting was keeping peace in the 
























































discussed in Paris the peaceful 
resolution of the Yugoslav crisis with 
Croatia’s President Franjo Tuđman.  
The next day President Mitterand talked 
to Serbia’s President Slobodan 
Milošević. (There is no information 











The President of the SFRY Presidency, 
Stjepan Mesić, the President of the 
Federal Executive Council, Ante 
Marković, and the leaders of the six 
Yugoslav republics signed a Ceasefire 
Agreement and a Memorandum on  
Extending the EC Monitoring in 

























Hina: “Members of the SFRY 
Presidency, the Federal Government of 
the SFRY, the Presidents of all 
Yugoslav republics, the EC Council and 
representatives of the EC member states 
took part in the peace conference on 
Yugoslavia in The Hague.” 

























































adopting a common statement that was 
signed by all parties. In it, the parties 
confirm that their common goal is “to 
achieve peace in Yugoslavia and to find 
a permanent solution that will be just 
and suit the legitimate interests and 
aspirations of all peoples”. 
For that purpose, they decided “to set 
up an Arbitration Commission within 
the framework of the Conference… We 
promise to seek a peaceful solution 
based on the principles and obligations 
as agreed upon within the CESC. We 
are determined never to recognise a 
change of borders, unless this was done 








Hina: “The participants … in the 
meeting with the Chairman of The 
Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord 
Carrington, Croatia’s President Franjo 
Tuđman, Serbia’s President Slobodan 
Milošević and the Federal Secretary for 
the National Defence, General Veljko 
Kadijević, resumed the talks on the 
implementation of the agreement that 
was signed with Lord Carrington. They 
also agreed to secure an absolute 
ceasefire on 18 September 1991 at 
12:00 … According to the statement, 
the three of them agreed to immediately 
resume continuous talks in order to 
secure peace, so that they would 
contribute to the resolution of the 
Yugoslav political and constitutional 
crisis and the success of the Conference 























































 “As they resumed the talks about the 
resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, that 
started at Igalo, the President of the 
Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, 
the President of the Republic of Serbia, 
Slobodan Milošević, and the Federal 
Secretary for the National Defence, 
General Veljko Kadijević, arrived today 
at a joint conclusion, that it is necessary 
to maintain and secure peace in the 
country by way of a complete ceasefire, 
This is the first condition for finding 
just political solutions. They deemed 
that a political solution to the crisis is in 
the interest of all Yugoslav peoples and 
republics as a way of preventing 
bloodshed and conflicts. When 
resolving the crisis, one must take into 
account the interests of all Yugoslav 
peoples and their equal status. The 
meeting participants concluded that the 
guidelines of The Hague Conference, 
which exclude that political solutions be 
imposed by force, will contribute to a 
peaceful and just solution to the 















During the Peace Conference on the 
SFRY, Lord Carrington organised a 
meeting between Presidents Tuđman, 
Milošević and General Kadijević in The 
Hague. It was agreed to lift the 
blockade of YPA’s army barracks in 
Croatia, to end all armed conflicts and 



































































At the meeting organised by Lord 
Carrington, Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević and General Kadijević  
agreed that the YPA would pull out of 















With Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev acting as intermediary, 
Croatia’s President Franjo Tuđman and 
Serbia’a President Slobodan Milošević 
signed a three-point memorandum … 
Under the point one the signatories 
declared that it is ”necessary to end all 
armed conflicts” in Yugoslavia. Under 
point two, the Serbian and Croatian 
Presidents must “within one-month 
period” start negotiating in order to 
settle all their disputes”. These 
negotiations should be conducted “in 
the interest of the Yugoslav peoples” 
and should take into account the rights 
and the sovereignty of the republics to 
enable the establishment of good 
neighbourly relations and peace.” 
Under point three, Milošević and 
Tuđman “asked from the USSR, the 
USA and the European Community to 
provide services in organising 












The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 
was held in The Hague. “At the 
Conference, another ceasefire was 
agreed to. Franjo Tuđman and all 
members of the SFRY Presidency 
signed the relating document.  Another 
document entitled Draft of the 

















































recognises the sovereignty off all 
Yugoslav republics… All Presidents of 
the Yugoslav republics, except Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević, accepted 
the document. Milošević emphasised 
that the draft ignores the fact that 
Yugoslavia still existed. Everybody 
were surprised at the fact that President 
of Montenegro Momir Bulatović raised 
no objections to the draft. Moreover, he 
accepted it entirely.” (HINA, Baza Eva, 
18 October 1991) 








“The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 
in The Hague broke up after the 
communist leader of Serbia refused to 
change his views on the peace plan 
presented by the European 
Community”, reported US UPI agency. 
“Some 9,7 million of inhabitants of the 
greatest Yugoslav republic are now 
facing a threat of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. The only outcome 
of the meeting that broke up after an 
hour is an agreement on a new 












“Presidents Milošević and Tuđman and 
General Kadijević signed in Geneva 
this evening an agreement on the peace 
implementation in Yugoslavia and the 
preparations for the deployment of UN 
troops, Vance said (Cyrus Vance, a 
special envoy of the UN General 
Secretary). According to France Press, 
the agreement calls for an immediate 
lift of the blockade of all federal army 
barracks in Croatia as well as the 
withdrawal of the federal army from 
that republic and a ceasefire that is to 
take effect the following day. Both 
sides are bounded by the agreement to 
































































aid to victims of the armed conflict. 
Vance said that the details about the 
mandate, organisation and regions 
where UN troops are to be deployed 
had already been discussed. Both 
Presidents are of the opinion that this 
should happen “as soon as possible”. 









In the resumption of the Peace 
Conference in Bruxelles, a conclusion 
was reached that the recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia is a fait accompli 
. While trying to postpone the decision 
on the recognition, Slobodan Milošević 
requested that the Peace Conference on 











“The Chairman of the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia, Lord Peter Carrington,  
said after  today’s talks with Presidents 
of Croatia and Serbia and the Minister 
of the Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that he was “disappointed” 
with the results of his efforts to revive 
the peace process. Slobodan Milošević 
said that the recognition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina depended on the new 
Yugoslav federation consisting of 
Serbia and Montenegro. He added that 
the three ethnic groups in Bosnia should 
first achieve consensus about the 
structure of the republic. “I hoped to 
hear from President Milošević today 
that he and Serbia are ready to 
recognise the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a sovereign and 
independent state.” (HINA, Baza Eva, 





















































The International Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia was held in London on 26 
& 27 August. Representatives of over 
thirty countries and organisations, 
Presidents of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, the President of 
Yugoslavia, Dobrica Ćosić, and Prime 
Minister Milan Panić took part in the 
Conference. Lord David Owen and 
Cyrus Vance were appointed Co-
chairmen of the Conference. 
Conference bodies that will operate in 
Geneva were also set up. A special 
resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was adopted. The declaration on 
Serbian aggression against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was not adopted because 













29 September: A new round of Geneva 
talks started. Alija Izetbegović will 
attend them for the first time. Presidents 
Tuđman and Čosić signed a joint 
statement condemning all actions 













The peace talks resumed in Geneva. 
They are widely regarded as “the last 
chance” for peace. For the first time 
Serbian President Milošević showed up 
in Geneva where he managed to 
persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept 
the proposed constitutional solutions for 













23/30 January: The Geneva talks, which 
began on 23 January, broke up on 30 
January after the Serbs and Muslims 
refused to sign the crucial parts of the 
peace plan. Vance and Owen left for 
































































The International Peace Conference on 
the Resolution of the Crisis in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was held in Athens. 
Besides its host, Greek Prime Minister 
Constantin Mitsotakis, the Conference 
was attended by Presidents Franjo 
Tuđman, Dobrica Ćosić, Slobodan 
Milošević, and Momir Bulatović and 
the leaders of the three peoples in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan 
Karadžić, Mate Boban and Alija 
Izetbegović. 
The newly appointed Conference Co-
chairman, Thorwald Stoltenberg, and 
American and Russian envoys Reginald 
Bartholomew and Vitalij Čurkin joined 
David Owen and Cyrus Vance who 
opened the Confernence. At the end of 
the meeting, Radovan Karadžić signed 
the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under condition that 
“the Assembly of the Republic of 
Srbska confirms at is meeting on 5 May 
the decision of its delegation that has 














The first round of new talks about the 
resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which was attended by 
Presidents Alija Izetbegović, Slobodan 
Miloševć and Franjo Tuđman started in 
Geneva. Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević reached during the Geneva 
meeting an agreement about  the 
principles to organise Bosnia and 
Herzegovina either as federal or con-

























































The talks on the resolution of the crisis 
in the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
resumed. Besides the Conference Co-
chairmen, Serbia’s President Slobodan 
Milošević, Croatia’s President Franjo 
Tuđman and seven members of the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
take part in them.  Alija Izetbegović and 
Ejup Ganić do not attend them. The 
nine-point Constitutional Proposal for 
Con-federation was put forward during 
the talks. The seven members of the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina 













At the meeting of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
in Geneva, Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević made, in co-operation with 
the Conference Co-chairmen, a 
statement by way of which they denied 
that there were plans to divide Bosnia 
and Herzegovina between the Croats 
and Serbs. The statement also says that 
“the only way to achieve permanent 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to 
recognise the interests of all three of its 
constituent peoples and to reach an 
agreement to establish the three 













The new decisive round of the talks 
starts in Geneva. It is attended by the 
leaders of the tree warring sides, 
Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović 
and Mate Boban, the Presidents of 
Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia, 
Milošević, Bulatović and Tuđman, and 
the interational intermediaries, Owen 
and Stoltenberg. The Serbs and Croats 



























































intermediaries to form a new “Union”, 
an association of the three ethnic 






During the Geneva talks, all three 
parties accepted a compromise proposal 
by international intermediaries Owen 
and Stoltenberg concerning the system 
of government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a union of three 
constituent republics.  Borders between 
the three republics will be established 
later. Izetbegović agreed to the 
constitutional proposal for the union of 
republics, but it is to be approved by the 
parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The talks focused on the maps again. 
Military leaders of the three sides 














The Co-chairmen of the International 
Conference on the former Yugo-slavia, 
Lord David Owen and Thorwald 
Stoltenberg, met at the Palace of 
Nations with Presidents Franjo 
Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and 
Momir Bulatović. Mate Boban and 
Radovan Karadžić also attended the 
meeting. The President of the 
Presidency of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, did not 
come. He sent a message to Owen and 
Stoltenberg: “I can attend the talks only 
if the Serbs withdraw from Bjelašnica”. 













In order to bring the talks on the maps 
to an end, the international 
intermediaries called the Presidents of 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro to 
Geneva to encourage all sides in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to accept what has 

















































of the warring sides met in Geneva to 
start the crucial part of the negotiations 
about Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The 
US agency also reported that 
Conference Co-charimen Owen and 
Stoltenberg met during the morning 
with all negotiating parties separately, 
although they did not try very hard to 
gather all negotiators at the same table. 
The yesterday’s discussion about the 
maps produced no results so that this 
issue will be discussed again. Lord 
Owen expressed hope that the 
negotiating parties would be more 
flexible than they were during previous 








The Co-chairmen of the International 
Peace Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia met in Geneva with 
Presidents Tuđman, Milošević, 
Bulatović and Izetbegović. Conference 
diplomats and officials informed that 
the three sides from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia’s President 
Milošević and Croatia’s President 
Tuđman did not met directly in the 
forenoon.  Bilateral talks which David 
Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg 
conducted this morning were about the 
maps of the three future ethnic 
republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Reuter/AFP/Hina: “As reported from 
Geneva, Alija Izetbegović, President of 
the Presidency of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, said today to the 
international peace intermediaries that 
he could not accept a peace plan for 



























































compromise without considerable 
changes of the proposed map showing 
a division of the country. The reports 
also say that due to the practical 
rejection of the plan, the intermediaries 
tried to persuade leader of the Bosnian 
Serbs Radovan Karadžić to make some 
territorial concessions in accordance 
with Muslim demands. Muslim 
officials added that Izetbegović insisted 
on additional 6% of the entire territory 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 
Muslim republic in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” (HINA, Baza Eva, 31 









British aircraft carrier Invincible.  The 
following attended the talks at the 
British aircraft carrier: Radovan 
Karadžić, Mate Boban, Alija 
Izetbegović and Presidents Franjo 
Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and 
Momir Bulatović, Conference Co-
chairmen David Owen and Thorwald 
Stoltrenberg and the representatives of 
the USA and Russia, Charles Redman 
and Vitalij Čurkin. The purpose of the 
meeting was to accept a peace plan for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was not 
much progress during the negotiations, 
because the Muslims still insisted on 
Neum, although Metković and Ploče 
were mentioned more than once. 
Izetbegović said that it was up to the 
parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina 













The European Union organised in 
Geneva a new round of talks about 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 














































Foreign Affairs, the following also 
attended the meeting: the leaders of the 
three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Karadžić, Boban and Izetbegović, 
Croatia’s President Tuđman, the 
Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, 
diplomatic representatives of Russia 
and the USA, the Co-chairmen of the 
Peace Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and 
David Owen.  The Geneva talks on 
Bosnia were followed by a meeting 
between the Serbs and Muslims. DPA 
reported that Serbia’s President 
Slobodan Milošević, the leader of the 
Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, the 
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Alija Izetbegović, and peace 
intermediaries Lord Owen and 
Thorvald Stoltenberg participated in the 
talks. In the evening on 29 November , 
talks were held between the Serbs and 
Croats. After a two-month break these 
were the first official talks within the 
framework of the International  










The Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, 
Milošević and Tuđman, and the 
representatives of the three warring 
sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Karadžić, Boban and Izetbegović 
participated in the Peace Conference in 
Geneva. The participants agreed about 
the territorial concession to the 
Muslims, i.e. the Muslim republic 
should have 33% of the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslim 
side agreed to it. However, they made 
objections with regard to the “quality of 
the territory offered to them”; in their 
view some towns were still 



























































sea and the Sava river for the Muslims 
and the status of Sarajevo. All three 
sides agreed to end the conflict during 






EU Ministers and the Co-chairmen of 
the international Peace Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia met with 
Presidents Tuđman, Bulatović, 
Milošević and Izetbegović as well as 
with Karadžić and Boban. The EU 
Ministers requested for the Muslim 
Republic in the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at least 1/3 of the territory. 
“The Christmas ceasefire” is holding. 
The talks in Bruxelles produced no 
results, except that the three sided 














The peace talks on the crisis in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina resumed in Geneva. 
They were attended by the Presidents of 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro - 
Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević 
and Momir Bulatović - and Alija 
Izetbegović, the leader of the Bosnian 
Muslims, Radovan Karadžić, President 
of the Republic of Srpska, Prime 
Minister Haris Silajdžić and Mile 
Akmadžić, the leader of the Croatian 
delegation from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Several bilateral talks 
between delegations were held, but no 
progress was made.  After separate talks 
between the delegations of Yugoslavia 
and Croatia, that were attended by 
Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and 
Bulatović and the Foreign Ministers of 
these countries, Vladislav Jovanović 
and Mate Granić,  a joint statement was 
signed about the normalisation of 
relations between the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of 


















































missions between the two states in 
Belgrade and Zagreb. 
The Republic of Srpska and the 
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna 
signed in Geneva a joint statement 
about permanent peace and the 
establishment of official relations 
between the two republics. Nikola 
Koljević, Vice-president of the 
Republic of Srpska, and Mile 
Akmadžić, the leader of the Croatian 
delegation from Bosnia and 






Peace talks about Bosnia and 
Herzegovina started at Wright-Patterson 
air base in Dayton, Ohio. Croatia’s 
President Franjo Tuđman, President of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija 
Izetbegović and Serbia’s President 
Slobodan Milošević take part in them 
together with representatives of the 
Contact Group and the EU. According 
to the US State Secretary, the 
conditions for permanent peace are the 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 
resolution of the human rights issue, 
including the responsibility for war 
crimes, a resolution of the status of 
Sarajevo and reintegration of Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranya and Western Syrmia. 
The negotiators will be introduced to 
the draft of the general peace agreement 
consisting of separate documents on 
territorial issues, disengagement of 
forces, ceasefire, constitution and 
elections as well as the issue of refugees 
and reconstruction. (HINA, Baza EVA, 


































































Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević 
and Croatia’s President Franjo Tuđman 
met in Dayton, with US State Secretary 
Warren Christopher acting as 
intermediary. In their joint statement, 
both Presidents agreed to fully 
contribute to the normalisation of 
relations between the two countries. 
The normalisation of relations will be 
based on “the acknowledgement of  the 
internationally recognised human rights 
of all citizens, the right of refugees and 
displaced persons in both countries to 
return to their homes, to restitution of 
property or to just compensation.” The 
statement also says that the basis for the 
normalisation of relations will also be 
”the support to a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranya and Western Syrmia that 
should take effect as soon as possible 
based on negotiations between the 
Croatian Government and the 















After 21-day negotiations held at 
Wright-Patterson air base in Dayton 
(Ohio, USA), Presidents Alija 
Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman and 
Slobodan Milošević initialled a global 
peace agreement on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Accord 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina enables the 
existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
integral state based on the full respect 
of its sovereignty by the neighbouring 
countries.  
The parties agreed about a constitution 
granting the establishment of federal 
institutions, a two-house parliament and 
a constitutional court consisting of nine 
judges, three of which shall be 




















































European Human Rights Court. Based 
on this Agreement, the country will 
have its central bank and a single 
currency. The central government of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have 
competence in foreign policy, foreign 
trade, customs policy, immigration 
policy, monetary policy, international 
law, communica-tions, traffic and the 
financing of government operations and 
commitments. The two-house 
parliament shall consist of 15 members 
of the Council of Peoples and of 42 
deputies in the House of 
Representatives. Two-thirds of all 
deputies in each Chamber shall be from 
the Federation. The Presidency shall 
consist of three members, one of which 
shall be a representative of the Republic 
of Srpska and the other two of the 
Federation. Besides the Presidency, the 
Council of Ministers shall also 
constitute executive power. The 
Federation shall govern 51% of the 
territory. Sarajevo has become united 
by way of the Agreement. It is within 
the Federation, but it shall be open to all 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 







“The Dayton Accords signing 
ceremony began in the Elysee Palace in 
Paris as French President Jacques 
Chirac gave his welcoming address. 
Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Alija 
Izetbegović and Slobodan Milošević 
were the first to sign the general 
framework agreement. Presidents 
Chirac and Clinton, Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl of Germany, British and Russian 
Prime Ministers John Major and Victor 





























































Minister Felipe Gonzales on behalf of 
the European Union signed the 
document as co-signatories thereafter. 
After the signing ceremony, each of the 
signatories, including OIC, the UN and 
NATO representatives, delivered short 
speeches. According to the protocol, the 
first to speak was President Alija 
Izetbegović, after him President 
Milošević and finally President 
Tuđman. Speeches were then delivered 
by UN Secretary Butros Butros Gali, 
General Secretary of NATO Javier 
Solana, European intermediary Carl 
Bildt, Prime Minister of Morocco 
Abdellatif Filali, who is presiding over 
the OIC contact group and finally by 
Prime Ministers Chernomydin, Major 
and Gonzales, Chancellor Kohl and 
President Clinton.” (HINA, Baza EVA, 
14 December 1995). 
 
We can classify these meeting into two groups depending on 
their type and “sponsors”: a) before the internationalisation of 
the Yugoslav crisis and b) after its internationalisation. 
Before the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis, i.e. 
before the international community became involved of in the 
resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević had 13 meetings: 
 1 meeting about the crisis in the SFRY between the 
Croatian and Serbian delegations in Belgrade; 
 2 meetings between the SFRY Presidency and the 
Presidents of the Yugoslav republics; 
 2 meetings between Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević (Karađorđevo,Tikveš) 
 2 meetings between Presidents Tuđman, Milošević 
and Izetbegović (Split, Belgrade); 
 6 meetings between the Presidents of the Yugoslav 
republics. 
After the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis Presidents 
Tuđman and Milošević met 35 times during the meetings 











































 2 meetings on the initiative of Presidents of foreign 
states (President Mitterand in Paris and President 
Gorbachev in Moscow); 
 11 meetings organised by the Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia which had a dual approach
5
: a political 
one, aiming to find a political solution and reach a 
political settlement  (7 meetings), and the other, 
dealing with military aspects in the field (5 meetings); 
 Presidents Tuđman and Milošević were invited to 7 
meetings related to the political aspect of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia together with other 
Presidents of the Yugoslav republics and the federal 
leadership; 
 Presidents Tuđman and Milošević and General 
Kadijević took part in the 5 meetings dealing with 
military issues together with Conference Co-chairman 
Lord Carrington (or Cyrus Vance). 
 There were 18 meetings organised by the 
International Peace Conference on the former 
Yugoslavia (Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Cyrus 
Vance; Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Vance as of 
May 1993). The leaders of all Yugoslav republics and 
the SFRY Government participated in this Conference 
at first. As the Conference focused mostly on the 
crisis in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidents 
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) were also invited besides 
the three warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Presidents Alija Izetbegović and Slobodan Milošević 
did not always accept invitations for different reasons, 
unlike the Croatian side who never refused to co-
operate with the international community. 
 4 meetings during the peace negotiations on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio. (We singled out the 
meetings at the beginning of the peace negotiations, 
1 November 1995;  a meeting between Presidents 
Tuđman and Milošević with US Foreign Secretary 
Warren Christopher acting as intermediary, 2 
November 1995; a meeting where the agreement on 
the normalisation relations between Croatia and 
Yugoslavia /Serbia and Montenegro/ was reached; 
the end of the peace negotiations when the 
agreements were initialled, 20 November 1995; and 
the signing of the peace agreement in the presence of 
                     
5 See: M. Libal, German Policy and Yugoslav Crisis 1991-1992, Golden 




















































all participants and representatives of the international 
community in Paris on 14 December 1995). 
This is a short review of the 48 “half-crazy” and “absurd” 
meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, during 
which “Bosnia was partitioned” without the Muslims being 
present. According to Mesić, everybody could see that on TV 
as well. 
What the media also showed, were the following facts:  
 out of 48 meetings which Mesić is trying to describe 
as bilateral meetings between Presidents Tuđman 
and Milošević, only two were bilateral indeed, i.e. 
between the two of them only (at Karađorđevo and 
Tikveš); all others were multilateral; 
 all meetings prior to the internationalisation of the 
Yugoslav crisis were held on the recommendation of 
the SFRY Presidency in order to find a solution to the 
Yugoslav crisis. First, bilateral meetings took place 
with each delegation holding a separate meeting with 
every other delegation, and then joint meetings 
between the Presidents of all Yugoslav republics; this 
refers to the meetings between Tuđman and 
Milošević
6 
as well as to the tripartite meetings 
between Izetbegović, Milošević and Tuđman; 
 all meetings after the internationalisation  of the 
Yugoslav crisis were organised by the international 
community; it were Presidents Tuđman and Milošević 
who most frequently attended those meetings besides 
other representatives of the interested parties; 
 President Alija Izetbegović
7
 participated in at least 31 
of the 48 meetings where Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević met; 
 out of 48 meetings at which, according to Mesić, 
“Bosnia was partitioned” by Tuđman and Milošević, 
Stjepan Mesić attended at least four; 
 all 48 meetings were open to public and the public 
was well informed about them by means of joint 
communiqués, press conferences, agreements signed 
or other statements; 
A serious politician and analyst would take on a task to 
present before The Hague Tribunal political options of the 
                     
6 From January until the end of March 1991, all Presidents of the Yugoslav 
republics held meetings on the each- -with-every-other basis. In this way, 
Izetbegović and Milošević also met at Karađorđevo and Tikveš. 
7 It is not quite clear from the available sources whether Izetbegović attended 
another three meetings; as irrelevant for an overall analysis, it remains to 











































adversaries in the former Yugoslavia and their strategies and 
to asses what was going on at international conferences on 
the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and 
Croatia, and later on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 1991 
until 1995. However, Mesić missed that chance. All he did say 
about these developments was that Milošević should be 
hanged and that Tuđman pursued “a dual policy” because he 
wanted “the partition of Bosnia”, and that their 48 meetings 
were “half-crazy” and “absurd”.  
It is obvious that The Hague’s Prosecutor Office was not 
interested in getting from Mesić a political overview of the 
developments in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Perhaps, the Prosecutor’s Office deemed that Mesić was not 
able to give such overview. All that they needed from him, 
being “an important political figure in the history of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and in the Croatian politics”
8
, was 
his statement in which he accused the Croatian policy of 
having been a criminal organisation that carried out the 
criminal enterprise not only in Croatia, but also in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
It is not our task to present here different political options 
and strategies during the negotiations on the resolution of the 
Yugoslav crisis. What lies in the focus of our interest is the 
“context” Mesić testified about. Mesić described the context of 
“the partition of Bosnia” as 48 “absurd” meetings.  
Instead of describing what was going on during those 
meetings, we will show what could have happened, had 
President Tuđman not attended them. 
It is quite obvious from their chronology, that the meetings 
were not arranged for the two Presidents to make 
arrangements about the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The outcomes of at least some of those meetings prove it. 
a. The first and second round
9 
of the talks between the 
Presidents of the Yugoslav republics, in the first half 
of 1991, produced no results that might lead to a 
peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis. However, the 
participants agreed that referendums should be called 
as a condition for separation. Based on the 
referendum held in May 1991, Republic of Croatia 
                     
8 By using these words Prosecutor M. Harmon introduced S. Mesić as 
witness (Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 march 
1998). 





















































was able to proclaim its independence. Had no 
agreement on the referendum, as the procedure 
enabling separation, been reached, the Federal 
Government and the SFRY Presidency would have 
had a legal ground to seek its annulment and not to 
recognise the result of the Croatian referendum. 
The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia had a dual 
approach. With regard to its political aspects, the 
Republic of Croatia accepted and met all political 
requirements that were imposed as a condition for 
her international recognition. Had she not done so, 
the Republic of Croatia would not have been 
recognised. Slobodan Milošević, i.e. Serbia and 
Montenegro, did not accept the international norms 
and rules. That is why sanctions were applied against 
them and they were excluded from international 
organisations. 
b. By accepting the negotiations related to the military 
aspects of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, i.e. 
the negotiations which lord Carrington conducted with 
Presidents Milošević and Tuđman and general 
Kadijević, Croatia saw the YPA pulling out of Croatia. 
Without this agreement, Croatia would have been 
faced with an armed conflict with the YPA on an even 
larger scale spreading over most of her territory. Its 
consequences would probably have been long-lasting 
as it would claim numerous lives and cause massive-
scale destruction. 
c. By participating in the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia, Croatian delegations (from 
Croatia and consisting of the Croats from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina alike) signed all peace agreements 
(Vance-Owen Peace Plan, Owen-Stoltenberg Peace 
Plan
10
), while other delegations rejected them. 
Although these plans did not lead to the resolution of 
the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they served as 
a basis for Washington Agreements. 
d. The Washington Agreements ended the conflict 
between the Croats and Bosniacs as well as the 
ethnic cleansing of the Croats in Central Bosnia. Had 
Croatia not signed them, this would not have 
happened. 
                     











































e. Without the Washington Agreements having been 
signed, Croatia would not have been able to demand 
that the UNPROFOR mandate be separated, i.e. to 
have a separate UN mission for the Republic of 
Croatia (UNCRO)
11
. The separation of the mandate of 
the UN troops for Croatia enabled military operations 
to be carried out easier. These operations resulted in 
the liberation of the occupied parts of the Croatian 
territory. 
f. Had there been no Flash and Storm Operations, the 
Dayton Peace Accords would never have taken 
place. 
The results of President Tuđman’s participation in the 48 
meetings, that Mesić perceived as “half-crazy” and “absurd”, 
were that the Republic of Croatia was able to declare her 
independence and sovereignty, that the YPA had to pull out of 
Croatia and that the peace agreements were signed which 
ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It is a fact that President Milošević attended those 
meetings as well, besides other participants, and that 
Izetbegović and even Mesić attended them, too. 
It is also a fact that Mesić wants to show these meetings 
as “half-crazy” and “absurd” bilateral meetings between 
Tuđman and Milošević only. 
Based on Mesić’s statements about these meetings, we 
can assume that Mesić, had he been in President Tuđman’s 
shoes, would not have attended the talks. 
This implies that there would be no ”partitioning of 
Bosnia”, because Yugoslavia would remain “whole” and 
“integral”, but also that there would be no independent Croatia 
recognised as such by the international community. 
                     
11 Those who advocate a thesis about Croatia’s dual policy towards Bosnia 
and Herzegovina should draw a conclusion from the fact that Croatia 
demanded a separate mandate of UN forces for the Republic of Croatia. 
This, too, confirms that there was no dual policy. Had there been any, it 
would be easier to redraw the borders in an area where there was no 




















































3. “There could be no agreement with Milošević as long as 
I preside over the Parliament, because I said that he 
should hang “ 
According to Mesić’s testimony, Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević held 48 meetings about “the partition of Bosnia” 
from which Mesić was excluded. In spite of that, Mesić claims 
that he was an obstacle to the agreement between Tuđman 
and Milošević to divide Bosnia by the end of 1993 as well as 
at the beginning of 1994. That is why President Tuđman 
wanted to remove him from the Parliament, so that he “could 
strike a deal with Milošević in a month”: 
After the meeting at Karađorđevo, I was excluded from the 
talks on Bosnia. In December 1993, Tuđman called me to 
his office and told me that I hampered his arrangements 
with Milošević concerning Bosnia, because I had told that 
Milošević should hang. Tuđman told me that he could 
strike a deal with Milošević on Bosnia in a month. He told 
me to go to Spa, Belgium. He also told me to start learning 
French so that I could be ambassador to France or 
Switzerland. I could not declare in public that I was going 
to study French, because I was elected to Parliament. I 
told Tuđman that I would take a month off. In January 




Source: Statement by Stjepan Mesić to Hague’s investigators, 19 April 
1997, enclosed. 
Neither the Prosecutor nor the Tribunal in its Judgements 
paid attention to logical contradictions in Mesić’s testimony. 
Mesić claims that the agreement “to divide Bosnia” was 
reached at Karađorđevo in March 1991, but he also claims 
that, in December 1993, Tuđman told him” that he could strike 
a deal with Milošević in a month”: Moreover, after having 
been on sick-leave/holiday for a month, in January 1994, 
Mesić claims that “a month should have been enough to strike 
a deal with Milošević”. The logical conclusion based on 
Mesić’s statement should be  -  even at the beginning of 
1994, no agreement “to divide Bosnia” was reached between 
Presidents Tuđman and Milošević and, that they did not 
manage to reach such an agreement either at Karađorđevo or 
                     
12 Further: “When I came back, I wrote to Tuđman. Tuđman’s secretary 
Zdravka Bušić called me to tell me that Tuđman wanted to speak with me. 
When we met, he told me that I did not do as I had promised. I told him 
that I had promised to go away for a month only and, that a month should 











































during their 48 meetings. They did not manage, because 
Mesić himself was an obstacle to such an arrangement.  
Stjepan Mesić also repeated his testimony from 1997, 
when he testified in The Hague again in 1998 – that he was 
removed from his office as President of the House of 
Representatives due to the pressure Milošević exerted on 
President Tuđman by the end of 1993, so that the two of them 
could strike “a deal on Bosnia”. Mesić said explicitly that 
President Tuđman wanted Mesić to resign his office as 
Parliamentary President because “there could be no 
agreement with Milošević as long as I preside over the 
Parliament“: 
I was for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as a senior 
official I could not directly clash, though it could have been 
seen from my interviews, so that President Tuđman, in 
December 1993, proposed that I should resign my post as 
Speaker of Parliament, that I should go to Grenoble or Spa 
for a couple of months, Spa in Belgium, for additional 
study of the French language, and to choose whatever 
ambassadorial post I wanted, because he could not come 
to any kind of agreement with Milošević while I was at the 
head of Parliament, because I said that he had to hang. 
Namely, this was something I told Milošević in his face, 
that the Serbs would hang him at the main square in 
Belgrade, at Terazije, when they failed to achieve their 
wartime goals, which he had advocated, because he had 
planned the war. 
I also asked him, when hanging to think of me, and that I 
would think of him. I stated that in public, but obviously this 
bothered him so much that he must have pressured 
Tuđman to remove me from this high position and after 
some time, I actually did leave.  
Source: Case no IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 
March 1998 
Furthermore, Mesić claims that he was on sick-leave/holiday 
for a month and that he said to President Tuđman on his 
return:  
I told him that I had promised to go away for a month only 
and that a month should have been enough to strike a deal 
with Milošević”. 





















































It is a fact that Mesić was an obstacle to reaching an 
agreement about Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not with 
Milošević. This can be  concluded even without thorough 
political analyses, but by looking at the overview of the 
meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević instead. 
In December 1993, two meetings were held, in January 
1994 only one. All three of them were organised by the Peace 
Conference on the former Yugoslavia. 
22 December 1993. The Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, 
Milošević and Tuđman, and the representatives of the 
three warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Karadžić, 
Boban and Izetbegović participated in the Peace 
Conference in Geneva. 
23 December 1993. EU Ministers and the Co-chairmen of 
the International Peace Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia met with Presidents Tuđman, Bulatović, 
Milošević and Izetbegović as well as with Karadžić and 
Boban. 
18 – 19 January 1994. The peace talks on the crisis in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina resumed in Geneva. They were 
attended by the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro - Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and 
Momir Bulatović - and Alija Izetbegović, the leader of the 
Bosnian Muslims, Radovan Karadžić, President of the 
Republic of Srpska, Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and Mile 
Akmadžić, the leader of the Croatian delegation from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. After separate talks between the 
delegations of Yugoslavia and Croatia, that were attended 
by Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and Bulatović and the 
Foreign Ministers of these two countries, Vladislav 
Jovanović and Mate Granić,  a joint statement was signed 
about the normalisation of relations between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia and 
the opening of diplomatic missions between the two states 
in Belgrade and Zagreb.
13
 
Therefore, there could be no bilateral negotiations or 
agreements “about Bosnia”, because Alija Izetbegović 
attended all three meetings. All three sides from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina attended them, besides the Co-chairmen of the 
International Conference and the EU Foreign Ministers. 
Moreover, in January 1994, the last meeting between 
Presidents Tuđman and Milošević took place, because the 
negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina organised by the 
                     











































Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ended with no 
results. The two of them will meet again in two years time, in 
Dayton in 1995. 
That is why both Mesić’s statements are false. The one 
about the Serbs and Croats partitioning Bosnia and 
Herzegovina without the Bosniacs in January 1994, as well as 
the one about Milošević requesting from President Tuđman to 
remove Mesić from his office as Parliamentary President.  
…both you and I watched in January 1994 meetings 
between representatives of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in 
Geneva, and when they were sitting around a map, 
FranjoTuđman, Karadžić, Boban and Milošević were 
standing to the side and they were reviewing these maps, 
what would belong to whom without the Muslims. 
I correct myself – only the Serbs and Croats were present, 
the Muslims were not there. This was in January 1994. 
This was broadcast on television. I was flabbergasted 
because I understood what this meant.” 
Source: Case no IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić from 16 to 19 
March 1998. 
In January 1994, the Peace Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia ended its work with no results, instead of resulting 
in the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Serbs 
and Croats.  
Another agreement was reached between Belgrade and 
Zagreb on 18 – 19 January 1994, when a joint statement was 
signed about the normalisation of relations between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia 
and about the opening of diplomatic missions between the 
two countries. In this way, if he insists on his view that he was 
an obstacle to reaching an agreement between Tuđman and 
Milošević, Mesić could only have been an obstacle to 
reaching an agreement about the normalisation of relations 
between the two states. 
The reason why Milošević agreed to normalisation of 
relations with Croatia was not because an agreement about 
Bosnia was reached between Belgrade and Zagreb. Quite the 
opposite, an agreement “about Bosnia” was reached between 
Presidents Tuđman and Izetbegović. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing arguments against Mesić’s 
statements are formal by their nature. Yet, they alone refute 
his ill-founded statements. The true indicators of the events in 




















































especially in the light of the fact that Mesić, as Parliamentary 
President, was well informed about negotiations with 
Izetbegović and the Bosniacs that were conducted in order to 
end the armed conflict between the Bosniacs and Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and find a permanent solution for the 
constitutional system of government in that country. Let us be 
reminded about the most important proposals and 
agreements
14
 from the period during which Mesić was 
allegedly “an obstacle” to an agreement between Tuđman 
and Milošević.  
The secret agreement about confederation signed by the 
President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and the 
President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija 
Izetbegović, “to develop the relations between the Bosnian 
Muslim republic and the Croatian republic within the Union of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in all spheres with a view to creating 
a common state that shall simultaneously build up con -
federal relations with the Republic of Croatia” (Geneva, 14 
September 1993).      
President Tuđman’s peace initiative with a proposal for a 
permanent and peaceful solution for the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia (Zagreb, 2 Novembar 1993).  
The Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris 
Silajdžić, and the Vice-president of the Croatian Government 
and Foreign Minister, Mate Granić, signed a Joint Declaration 
(Sarajevo, 12 November 1993) in order to reach a 
comprehensive agreement about military and humanitarian 
issues. 
The contractual agreement to bring about permanent 
peace between the Croatian and the Muslim Bosniac peoples 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and about the bases for their 
future co-existence (Bonn, 10 January 1994); President 
Tuđman’s proposal which Izetbegović thought favourably of, 
although he did not sign it. 
The Proposal for the Declaration presented to the Muslim 
Bosniac delagation at the Peace Conference on the former 
Yugoslavia by the Croatian delegation (Geneva, 19 January 
1994). The first three Declaration items are: 
All military conflicts between the Croats and Muslims in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall end immediately to enable 
                     
14 Documents and excerpts from documents have been quoted from the 
book: M. Tuđman, The Truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina, Documents 
1991-1995  (Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini, Dokumenti 1991-1995) , Slovo 











































the implementation of the agreement on safe passage of 
convoys and on other humanitarian issues. 
Should a Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 
three republics be established, as proposed by the 
Conference on the former Yugoslavia, we propose that the 
Union build up con-federal relations with the Republic of 
Croatia pursuant to President Tuđman’s proposal of 10 
January 1994 and President Izetbegović’s response of 15 
January 1994. 
Should, for any reason, the establishment of a Union 
consisting of three republics fail, we propose that a 
confederation between the Muslim Bosniac Republic and 
the Republic of Croatia be established. 
These documents as well as the efforts made to implement 
permanent peace show that it took “several months” for 
President Tuđman to reach “an agreement about Bosnia”, 
however not with Milošević as Mesić claimed, but with 
Izetbegović. Within these few months President Tuđman 
provided a basis for the Washington Agreements to be signed 
in March 1994. These Agreements based on “the secret 
agreement” of 14 September 1993, the Contractual 
Agreement (Bonn, 10 January 1994) and the Declaration of 
19 January 1994. 
It is a fact that these initiatives and the foregoing 
proposals by President Tuđman led to the Washington 
negotiations and Agreements during March 1994. These were 
the proposals that were, in December 1993 and January 
1994, presented as “an agreement about Bosnia” to the 
Bosniacs, not to Milošević. These proposals were made on 
the Croatian initiative for the Bosniacs to accept them. 
Suppressing facts about the efforts of the Croatian policy to 
achieve peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is what makes 
Mesić a perjurer before The Hague Tribunal. He did not 
suppress these facts out of ignorance, but for the sake of his 
personal political ambition. 
4. “Mr. President, I will never be against the HDZ policy 
and your leadreship” 
What Mesić did not mention when testifying before The 
Hague Tribunal is his role in attempts to overthrow President 
Tuđman by the end of 1993 and at the beginning of 1994. The 
Manolić-Mesić faction within the HDZ played a key role in it. 




















































conversations with President Tuđman in December 1993 and 
January 1994 where quite different from the ones he told 
about. They certainly had nothing to do with Milošević and “a 
deal about Bosnia”. By these conversations, President 
Tuđman tried once more to save the unity of the HDZ in order 
to avoid splits in the party and a parliamentary crisis.  
The attempts to provoke a parliamentary crisis in the 
spring of 1994 failed. There were no major splits and 
disturbances in the HDZ. The attempt to overthrow President 
Tuđman ended in a total defeat of Mesić and Manolić and led 
to their final break with the HDZ. This was confirmed in the 
message about “the attempts to provoke a split in the HDZ” 
that the HDZ Presidency sent to HDZ members and the 
Croatian public on 24 April 1994: 
The initiative by Mr. J. Manolić and Mr. S. Mesić to found a 
new political party, which they called the Independent 
Croatian Democrats, marks the end of their departure from 
the HDZ Programme and policy. Their departure from the 
mainstream policy of the HDZ has been going on for more 
than a year and it speeded up after the 2
nd
 Convention of 
the HDZ from 15 to 16 October last year.
15
 
The HDZ Presidency established that the process leading to 
the break of Mr. Manolić and Mr. Mesić with the HDZ had 
been taking place for more than a year and that it intensified 
after the 2
nd
 Party Convention in October 1993. Academician 
Aralica described four stages of their plan to cause a split in 
the HDZ and provoke a parliamentary crisis,
16
 with regard to 
the dynamics of developments, methods of political struggle 
and slogans that were used. One of the players involved in 
those events was Stjepan Mesić, although he stayed in the 
background at first. 
During the first stage, Manolić and Mesić were busy 
preparing the public for the crisis with the help of a part of the 
                     
15 Look for the message by the HDZ Presidency under the title “No one has 
the right to put the country to jeopardy” in: ZNA SE, The HDZ’ Contribution 
to Strengthening the Sovereignty of the Croatian State (HDZ u borbi za 
učvršćivanje hrvatske državne suverenosti) by Franjo Tuđman, Ph.D., 
Secretariat General of the HDZ Headquarters, Zagreb, p. 113. 
16 Academician Ivan Aralica rendered a detailed account of the attempts to 
provoke a parliamentary crisis. At that time, he was a Vice-President of 
the House of Counties of the Croatian Parliament and was therefore, 
familiar with the situation.  His analysis of the events was published in 
Vjesnik by the end of September and at the beginning of October 1994.  
Since he is a credible witness of those developments, we used his 
analysis and assessments, although we presented the periods related to 











































press, tabloids mostly.  The message they were trying to sent 
was that “it is possible to seize power and overthrow Tuđman 
and the HDZ even before the election by causing a split in the 
HDZ between the right and left wing, whereby the left wing 
would encourage the technocrats to join them“.
17
 In this way, 
the crisis would be transferred to the Parliament, where the 
HDZ defectors and the opposition would form the majority. 
The call to overthrow President Tuđman and the HDZ 
Government according to the foregoing scenario was 
formulated in “the letter from a group of six”. It was an open 
letter to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr Franjo 
Tuđman, that was published just before the 2
nd
 Convention of 
the HDZ.
18
 Its authors requested from President Tuđman to 
resign. Manolić and Mesić were not among the six authors of 
the letter, but they ordered it: “… it is highly likely that Manolić 
was the initiator of “the letter from a group of six”, one of 
those who ordered it and arranged that it be published before 
the 2
nd
 Convention of the HDZ when many people believed 
that there would be a split in the HDZ.”
19
 
However, during the second stage, at the 2
nd
 HDZ 
Convention, no split in the HDZ occurred. Neither the left wing 
nor the right wing won, but President Tuđman’s mainstream 
policy instead. In his speech, he called both, the left and the 
right wing to put up their candidates for the president of the 
HDZ:” … I would have Šeks as a right-wing candidate… and 
Mesić or Manolić as left-wing candidates … then we will see 
how strong the left and the right wing really are”. 
At the Convention, “there were 21 candidates for five 
Party vice-presidents, 31 for five Presidency members and 6 
candidates for the general secretary.” President Tuđman 
pleaded not to choose “those who engaged in in-fighting … 
on whom not only the opposition, but also all kinds of 
schemers abroad counted as being capable of causing a split 
and a shift to the left or the right”. He pleaded for “his” 
candidates in order to elect such inner leadership “no one 
could object to” and that would be acceptable “to the Croatian 
                     
17 I. Aralica, Vjesnik, September/October 1994. 
18 The letter was published on 20 September 1993 and among those who 
signed it were Ivo Banac, Krsto Cviić, Slavko Goldstein, Vlado Gotovac, 
Vesna Pusić and Ozren Žunec. (see: I. Aralica, What did I say about 
Bosnia (Što sam rekao o Bosni),PIP Pavičić,  Zagreb, 1995, p.128-130.)  




















































people and to the world”. However, “neither Mesić nor Šeks 
… have to be …members of the inner leadeship”.
20 
    
The initiators of the split in the HDZ, Josip Manolić and 
Stjepan Mesić, failed to achieve their goals at the 2
nd
 
Convention of the HDZ of October 1993. Moreover, they 
became political losers as they were not elected to the inner 
Party leadership. This meant that their political careers were 
past their peaks, although they were still holding high offices: 
Josip Manolić was President of the House of Counties of the 
Croatian Parliament and Stjepan Mesić President of the 
House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament. 
In the third stage, which followed after their fiasco at the 
HDZ Convention, Manolić and Mesić transferred the crisis 
from the party to the Croatian parliament. In spite of the 
promises they made to the opposition and the general public, 
they did not manage to undermine the HDZ’ majority in 
neither of the Parliament Houses. Moreover, it turned out that 
the few HDZ deputies who followed them were neither the left 
nor the right wing, let alone technocrats, but a group of people 




Even under such circumstances, before Manolić’s and 
Mesić’s final break with the HDZ, President Tuđman tried to 
preserve the unity of the HDZ, although he knew that only a 
few deputies in both Parliament Houses would follow Manolić 
and Mesić. At the joint meeting of the HDZ Presidency and 
the HDZ Club of Deputies, that was held on 25 January 1994 
in the Croatian Parliament , the President of the HDZ and of 
the Republic of Croatia spoke of “the attempts to provoke a 
constitutional crisis” and “a split “ in the HDZ. He emphasised 
in his speech: 
I am pleased to say this: I talked to Stipe Mesić and 
explained to him that he encouraged them, the adversaries 
of the HDZ in the country and abroad, who do not want 
this, but some other Croatia, to count on him as the 
President of the Parliament, and that they want to use him 
and send him, therefore, invitations to Sarajevo and Kuala 
                     
20 Franjo Tuđman, Ph.D., ZNA SE, The HDZ’ Contribution to Strengthening 
the Sovereignty of the Croatian State (HDZ u borbi za učvršćivanje 
hrvatske državne suverenosti) ., Secretariat General of the HDZ 
Headquarters, Zagreb, 1995; The Speech at the 2nd Convention of the 
HDZ in Vatroslav Lisinski Concert Hall, Zagreb, 15 October 1993, p. 35-
39. 











































Lumpur. Mesić told me: ”Mr. President, I will never be 
against the HDZ policy and your leadership”.
22
 
Mesić never denied the words President Tuđman spoke 
before the deputies in the Parliament of the Republic of 
Croatia. He also never claimed that President Tuđman 
misinterpreted their conversation, until he put that 
conversation into a quite different context before The Hague 
Tribunal. Nevertheless, he did not explain before The Hague 
Tribunal the context of “the invitation to Sarajevo”. On 7 
February, the Croatian People’s Council of the Assembly of 
the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded in 
Sarajevo. The Council, that based its programme on an 
indivisible and decentralised Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
announced that its delegation would participate in the next 
Geneva negotiations on Bosnia and Herzregovina.
23
 
As we already mentioned, in February 1994, the draft of 
the solution for the system of government for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, that would be specified by the Washington 
Agreements, was already agreed on. Had the delegation of 
the Croatian People’s Council subsequently joined the 
international talks, the position of the official Croatian policy 
would have been weakened. Mesić’s presence at the 
founding assembly of the Croatian People’s Council in his 
capacity as the President of the Croatian Parliament would 
have sent a wrong message to the Croatian and the 
international public, because the Council was an opposition to 
the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24
  That is why the 
President requested from the President of the Parliament not 
to accept the invitation to Sarajevo and to resign from his 
office. It was because his faction did not enjoy the support 




As President Tuđman never wanted to reject the people 
he worked with and, since he wanted to keep all state-building 
political options within the HDZ, he offered Mesić to choose 
                     
22 Franjo Tuđman, Ph.D., ZNA SE, The HDZ’ Contribution to Strengthening 
the Sovereignty of the Croatian State (HDZ u borbi za učvršćivanje 
hrvatske državne suverenosti)., Secretariat General of the HDZ 
Headquarters, Zagreb, 1995; The Speech at the Joint meeting of the HDZ 
Presidency and the HDZ Club of Deputies, that was held on 25 January 
1994 in the Croatian Parliament, p. 84. 
23 HINA, Baza EVA, 7 February 1994. 
24 Those who advocated the policy of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
often referred to the members of the Croatian People’s Council as “Alija’s 
Croats”. 
25 I can testify about it from first-hand knowledge, because the President told 




















































an ambassadorial post for himself and to remain, in this way, 
in the Party and a part of the official policy. Mesić’s story 
about Milošević requesting his removal from office, because 
he presented an obstacle to the final agreement on Bosnia 
was meant to deceive. On the one hand, he wanted to 
conceal how disloyal he was to the policy he was a part of 
and, which he obstructed secretly in order to overthrow 
President Tuđman and provoke a parliamentary crisis. On the 
other hand, by claiming that at the beginning 1994, he was 
still a key political figure, an obstacle to Presidents Tuđman 
and Milošević alike, he wanted to attach importance to himself 
before the Tribunal. 
President Tuđman’s political offer to Josip Manolić and 
Stjepan Mesić was made public in 1994 already. He talked 
about it personally and the press wrote about it in detail from 
1994 onward. In spite of the fact that they lost at the Party 
Convention by secret ballot and that they did not win the 
majority support in the Croatian Parliament, President 
Tuđman offered to Josp Manolić, who initiated his overthrow 
“to stay in the Party and have his faction and to fight for his 
views within the party”. The President offered to Mesić and 
Manolić to have their faction within the HDZ and to stay in the 
HDZ
26
. They rejected his offer, went on to provoke the 
parliamentary crisis and lost. The account of those events, 
that Mesić gave in The Hague, is insincere and false and 
highly hypocritical, politically speaking. 
At the beginning of 1994, his only political asset was his 
office as President of the House of Representativess of the 
Croatian Parliament. But even this did not belong to him, but 
to the Party that appointed him. To compensate for the loss of 
that political asset and for the loss of power, which he found 
very hard
27
, he gave false testimony and ignored the truth 
when testifying before The Hague Tribunal.  
In the fourth stage of their attempts to provoke a 
parliamentary crisis, the HDZ defectors, who joined the 
opposition together with Manolić and Mesić, could not 
jeopardise the HDZ majority in neither of the Houses of the 
Croatian Parliament. They could not unite the opposition as 
they provided no basis for a joint political platform. They could 
neither agree on the distribution of the seats in the Parliament 
nor on the new rules of procedure. Mesić and Manolić could 
not retain their offices as Presidents of the House of 
Representatives or the House of Counties, although they did 
                     
26 I. Aralica, ibid., Vjesnik 1994. 















































On 23 May 1994, the House of Counties of the Croatian 
Parliament relieved Josip Manolić from his posit and elected 
Katica Ivanišević as its new president. 
On 24 May 1994, the House of Representatives of the 
Croatian Parliament relieved Stjepan Mesić from his posit ad 
elected Nedjeljko Mihanović as its new president.
29
  
The HND – the Croatian Independent Democrats, a party 
founded by Josip Manolić and Stjepan Mesić, did not manage 
to win at least one seat in the next 1995 election for the 
House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament. The 
Party also failed to win a seat in the 1997 election for the 
House of Counties. This indicates clearly that the faction and 
its leaders did not enjoy the support within the HDZ or of the 
Croatian voters.  It also confirms that the few HDZ deputies 
who joined them in 1994, did so only because they were 
dissatisfied with their political status in the party and that their 
motive was the power struggle. 
Mesić did not testify before The Hague Tribunal about 
those events in the HDZ and about his role in them, so that he 
could describe his conversations with President Tuđman and 
his break with him, which followed thereafter, as a conflict 
over a political program, and not as a mere power struggle.   
Mesić also did not testify that, in the critical period that he 
himself emphasised – in December 1993 – the strongest 
opposition party drew up “a strategy of political action” with 
detailed plans to provoke a parliamentary crisis and, “to call 
an early parliamentary election  in July, or in September 1994 
at the latest”, in order to overthrow the HDZ . Mesić also did 
not mention in his testimony before the Tribunal that the 
activity of his and Manolić’s faction was harmonised with “the 
strategy of political action” that was based on two 
assessments: that the conflict between the Croats and 
Bosniacs in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue  (i.e.”that 
peace efforts will produce no results”) and about the 
possibility of reaching an agreement with “the reasonable 
                     
28 For a more detailed account see I. Aralica ibid. Vjesnik, 1994. 
29 A. Mijatović (editor), Ten Years of the Croatian Democratic Union (Deset 
godina Hrvatske demokratske zajednice), memorial edition, Croatian 
























































Mesić also did not mention in his testimony that the 
internal key document of the opposition party envisaged the 
period for implementing “the strategy of political action”: 
 January and February: to promote the idea of an early 
election; to reach an agreement between the 
opposition parties and to promote it; to promote the 
need for a shift in power; to build up the expectations 
of a victory of the opposition; 
 March and April: to choose two or three topics that will 
strain the relations with the HDZ and to promote in the 
media the weaknesses of the HDZ and the 
differences within it; special attention it to be given to 
the topics such as corruption, crime, abuse of power, 
lack of care about different social groups etc; 
 May and June: the conflict reaches its climax. This will 
result in walking out of the Parliament in protest, in 
raising the question of President’s responsibility 
(possibly). The goal is to simulate a governmental 
crisis. To encourage a divide in the HDZ. 
Mesić did not testify about all this. He could not do so, 
because he would otherwise have to admit that, back then in 
1994, he was still loyal to President Tuđman and the HDZ 
policy in public, while at the same time he was, together with 
Manolić, secretly working for the opposition and, together with 
him, greatly contributed to the implementation of “the strategy 
of political action”. Their involvement in this political 
conspiracy was crucial. Manolić was “a reliable source” giving 
information about the split in the HDZ to the tabloids. Besides, 
he initiated “the letter from a group of six”, demonised “the 
Herzegovinian lobby”, provoked a conflict about the Party’s 
Christian-Democratic orientation and presented the conflict 
between the Bosniacs and Croats as inexcusable magnum 
crimen.
31
 Together with Mesić, he organised the most 
important actions that were taken to “simulate a governmental 
crisis” and to request President Tuđman’s resignation. 
Although “the strategy of political action” included “many 
elements of a legal parliamentary struggle” it “also included 
                     
30 “Strategy of Political Action of the Croatian Social Liberal Party until July or 
September 1994”; a quotatin from: I. Aralica, ibid., Vjesnik, 1994.  











































many illegal methods or those that were almost illegal and, as 
such, questionable from the ethical point of view”.
32
 
As he testified in The Hague in 1998, Mesić remained 
loyal to the 1994 strategy goals. However, by suppressing 
some important facts about the political developments from 
that period, by his false accounts of his own or President 
Tuđman’s statements, Mesić revealed his own “dual policy” 
and how unethical his conduct is. By testifying before The 
Hague Tribunal, he tired to legalise his own “clandestine 
policy” from that period based on falsehoods and lies. The 
Prosecutor’s Office helped him, while The Hague Tribunal, 
although warned about it, was manipulated. 
5. P.S. The Deceived Tribunal 
The Prosecutor’s Office requested a closed session so that 
Stjepan Mesić might testify as a secret witness. Prosecutor 
Harmon gave the following explanation of his request: ”He 
believes, Mr. President and the Prosecutor supports him in 
this belief, that he and his family are at considerable personal 
risk if his testimony is made public – and if his request to 
proceed in a closed session is denied.”
33
 
The Prosecutor’s statement shows that both, the 
Prosecutor’s Office and Mesić, feared the possibility that the 
testimony be made public. The Defence arguments give us 
reasons to believe that the reasons for their fears were 
different. As it objected the closed session the Defence 
warned the Tribunal: 
Everything that Mr Mesić said in his testimony for the 
Prosecutor has – he has repeated in numerous interviews. 
I have collected maybe 200 of those interviews. Not a 
single statement that he made in his statement of the 
Office of the Prosecutor exists which has not been 
repeated on innumerable occasions.
34
 
Source: Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by S. Mesić, from 16 to19 
march 1998. 
                     
32 I. Aralica, ibid, Vjesnik, 1994. 
33 Witness Stjepan Mesić, The Hague, from 16 to 19 March 1998. 
34 According to the Prosecutor’s opening statement, Mesić was supposed to 
confirm in his testimony what he had already stated in writing in his 
deposition to the Hague’s investigetors in 1997. Besides that, the General 
Blaškić Defence argued: “After his deposition has been published … Mr. 
Mesić gave, on two or three occasions. several interviews where he used 
it as a means of his political struggle”. (Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by 




















































The Defence had every right to warn the Tribunal:  “We are 
concerned in protecting the integrity of this Tribunal”. Because 
of ”… our fear that the politicians may draw the Tribunal into 
some kind of political manipulations so that the Tribunal may 




That is precisely what happened. At the time when he 
made his statements to the investigators and testified before 
The Hague Tribunal, in 1997 and 1998, his political 
significance and reputation in Croatia did not amount to much. 
He wanted to take advantage of the fact that he was the key 
witness for the Prosecution, though perhaps not so much 
against General Blaškić, but rather against the official 
Croatian policy of the time and against President Tuđman. He 
succeeded in it, because his testimony served as a basis for 
new indictments for a criminal enterprise that was carried out 
by President Tuđman as the head of the criminal 
organisation. 
Therefore, Stjepan Mesić deliberately went to testify in 
order to be rewarded politically for his testimony not only from 
President Tuđman’s adversaries in Croatia, but also from 
certain political circles abroad, that were numerous and 
influential. 
The motive for his testimony was not to render an account 
of political and historical events, to produce facts and 
information, to refer to new documents or knowledge of 
crimes within the competence of The Hague Tribunal.
36 
The 
motive for his testimony was to be rewarded politically for the 
very fact that he testified, and not for what he testified about. 
Politically, Mesić decided to make the most of the fact that he 
testified as the Prosecution witness against the official 
Croatian policy. At the same time, he put in a great deal of 
effort to conceal the contents of his testimony. It is because 
he was aware of the fact that he was not telling the truth. But 
he was trying to conceal this fact as well as the entire 
contents of his testimony in order not to reveal the means that 
helped him to achieve his goal. 
                     
35 Ibid. 
36 Based on what we have already pointed to, he testified about nothing new, 
true or important. When one carefully reads his testimony, he or she may 
find quite opposite views in it. He claimed that he knew nothing about the 
meeting at Karađorđevo, but that he heard rumours that an agreement “to 
divide Bosnia” was reached there. Thereafter, he would say that in 
January 1994, President Tuđman needed few more months to reach an 











































Stjepan Mesić does not care about the truth, or even 
about the lies he told. All he cares about is his goal. Being a 
political pragmatist and lacking any political convictions of his 
own, cynical about the values of the people around him, 
Mesić openly mocked the Prosecutor’s Office and The Hague 
Tribunal at the moment he was confronted with evidence that 
he was not telling the truth and that he was changing his 
testimony and views depending on his political ambitions. 
Question: Can we conclude that you did not always 
tell the truth – it depended on the political objectives 
of the Party you belonged to? 
S. Mesić: Only my wife believes that I always tell the truth.   
Source: Case No.IT-95-14-A, testimony by S.Mesić, from 16 until 19 
March 1998. 
Mesić played the card that enabled his comeback to the 
political arena as the key Prosecution witness against the 
official Croatian policy. It was an asset that could not 
guarantee him success and political comeback still, but 
presented a kind of political credit granted from players 
abroad. At the time when Tuđman’s policy was a thorn in the 
flash of certain international political circles, when President 
Tuđman’s chances of recovery were slim and the ruling party, 
the HDZ, was about to face in-fighting and a power struggle, 
Mesić became a rising star supported by the Prosecutor’s 
office and protected by The Hague Tribunal. 
Pleased that he played his cards so well, Mesić openly 
mocked the Prosecutor and the Tribunal alike, as he 
answered the question as to whether he was telling the truth: 
“Only my wife believes that I always tell the truth.“  
 
